A moral relativist will most likely assert that moral quarrels are insoluble because moral beliefs are not strictly true or false, because there are no facts in the world that they do this – no moral facts. Therefore, such a “truth, which they can be said to have, is based on subjective elements – states of mind like our desires and emotions. As these subjective elements vary between people and cultures, they can create conflicts that no appeal to objective facts could ever resolve. I should put this statement into perspective: “As such, we should not expect much more moral coherence from people than rational (or almost rational) IAs.” Beyond arguments that appeal to moral disagreements, there is a significant motivation for moral antirealism in concerns about the metaphysics of moral realism and, in particular, whether moral realism could reconcile with (so-called) naturalism. It is difficult, to say the least, to clearly define naturalism. But the underlying idea is quite easy to convey. After naturalism, the only facts we should believe in are those that are supported by the results of science, or at least that are compatible with them. From a presumed fact that its existence is neither established by science nor compatible with it, one can discover how naturalism wants there to be no such fact. If moral realism requires facts that are incompatible with science (as many think), this alone would be a huge argument against it. In the first line, many find that people are different in their emotions, attitudes, and interests, and then argue that moral disagreements simply reflect the fact that the moral demands that people accept (despite appearances) are really ways to express or serve their different emotions, attitudes, and interests. Bob: “But if, up to the third decimal place, the meaning is similar or similar in some ways to provide similar answers to that particular question, even if our morality is not in principle identical, I would not hesitate to invoke the intuitions of transpersonal morality.” In case of deep disagreement, the initial and main goal should simply be to clearly understand where the interlocutor comes from and to be well understood himself. Someone doesn`t have to be a bad person (selfish, sexist, racist, etc.) to disagree with you. You don`t need to be ignorant, stupid, brainwashed, or crazy.
Given the complexity and uncertainty of many topics and phenomena, there is room for virtually every topic you can imagine at reasonable divergences.. . . .